Since he had never served in the military, Pak understands little of the military mind. He trusts that those in charge know what they are doing, although he fervently wishes there were another way. He is tired of the constant state of mobilization and the endless militaristic language that is broadcast via radio, television, newspapers and public announcements.
When in the summer of 2004 both Koreas agreed to dismantle loudspeakers, signboards and other propaganda tools directed at each other across the DMZ, it was as though a heavy burden had been lifted off his shoulders. It provided a measure of hope, just like the inter-Korean summit of 2000 had done.
And it is hope he misses in the current situation. When he was still alive, leader Kim Il Sung also emphasized the importance of a strong army. But at the same time, he offered the people hope in a bright future. As much as Pak believes the “military first policy” to be correct for this time and place, it has dawned on him that military power may well offer security, but it cannot offer hope. And hope is what will motivate his people toward development. What is the hope that he can pass on to his son?
It was not difficult for him to predict how events would unfold in late Spring 2006. After disrupting his country’s foreign trade with banking sanctions, the USA turned its attention to the quagmire in the Middle East. Stung by the threat these banking actions represented for China’s own trade, Beijing increasingly treated the DPRK with annoyance and impatience, while it too refocused attention to geopolitical considerations, joining with Russia to gain influence in the oil-rich Middle East. Japan seized the opportunity to ingratiate itself to the USA by becoming its blunt instrument, using the abductee issue to please its domestic electorate, while intensifying international threat perceptions of the DPRK. Meanwhile, the conciliatory Roh Moo Hyun government of South Korea was losing out to a more aggressive, US-friendly opposition.
Clearly something was needed to shake up these negative developments for the DPRK. In its opaque wisdom, the DPRK fell back on the tried and true strategy of brinkmanship and rolled its latest long-range missile, the Taepodong II, onto the launching pad.
When the USA reacted stridently with threats of dire consequences, Pak knew that it would be impossible for the DPRK military to back down. He had his personal opinion about what his country should do, but he kept these to himself. He suspected that in reality, the USA actually wanted the DPRK to fire the rocket. It would play into the hands of American and Japanese plans for a regional missile defense system. And because China wants desperately to avoid this development, they would need to show that they are capable of regional threat limitation, and that means demonstrating their ability to control the DPRK.
Once again, concludes Pak, as so often throughout our history, the regional powers are using Korea as a pawn for their own games. Why are we helping them play these games? What can we possibly gain?
Pak quickly suppresses these thoughts. These are issues for greater minds to deal with. And greater minds -- this he refuses to doubt -- are directing the destiny of his people. He wishes fervently that he could understand the logic that he seems to be missing. Then he files these concerns in a hidden compartment of his mind, while he concentrates on the small part of the puzzle that he does understand.
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